Richmond/Al-Ghazālī’s Moral Psych, 1. Relinquishing Vice

Chapter One begins by questioning whether the Aristotelian understanding of virtue remains coherent in a religious context or whether the idea of self-control provides a better description of the lived reality of temptation within a monotheistic worldview. For al-Ghazālī, the subject of vice has multiple dimensions that relate directly to the mind and body. He sees most expressions of vice as the loss of the equilibrium that determines virtue, and these particular vices directly correspond with those listed in classical and Islamic virtue ethics. On the other hand, we find that specific states, although still contextualized according to circumstances, are more dependent on the dictates of revelation and its associated commentary. An example explored at the end of the chapter is al-Ghazālī’s prohibitions regarding the tongue, which focuses more on the idea of sin than vice.